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Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and 
enhance efficiency by increasing individual payoffs in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We 
report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly 
efforts. Allowing group members to communicate before choosing efforts leads to more 
aggressive competition and greater coordination, but also results in substantially lower payoffs 
than a control treatment without communication. Our experiment thus provides evidence that 
communication can reduce efficiency in competitive coordination games. This contrasts sharply 
with experimental findings from public goods and other coordination games, where 
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1. Introduction 
The early literature on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria documents that 
coordination failure is common in the laboratory (Van Huyck et al., 1990, 1991; Cooper et al., 
1990, 1992). This important finding has been interpreted as relevant for environments ranging 
from individual organizations to macroeconomies, and has led to an active research agenda to 
investigate possible mechanisms to resolve this coordination failure. Experiments have studied 
whether coordination improves through repetition and fixed-matching protocols (Clark and 
Sefton, 2001), full information feedback (Brandts and Cooper 2006), introduction of between 
group competition (Bornstein et al., 2002; Riechmann and Weimann, 2008), sequential play 
(Camerer et al., 2004), the use of entrance fees (Cachon and Camerer, 1996), and gradual 
increases in group size (Weber, 2006). One of the most effective solutions to the coordination 
failure problem is communication, even when it is merely nonbinding “cheap talk.”  
Many experimental studies have shown that cheap talk can facilitate coordination on the 
efficient equilibrium in experimental games with Pareto-ranked equilibria (Cooper et al., 1992; 
Van Huyck et al., 1993; Charness, 2000; Charness and Grosskopf, 2004; Blume and Ortmann, 
2007; Duffy and Feltovich, 2002, 2006; Riechmann and Weimann, 2008). For example, Van 
Huyck et al. (1993) demonstrate that pre-play communication is efficiency-enhancing in 
coordination games. Blume and Ortmann (2007) find that costless nonbinding messages, even 
when they have minimal information content, can facilitate quick convergence to the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium. Communication also enhances efficiency in intergenerational 
coordination experiments (Chaudhuri et al., 2005). One reason that communication is so 
effective is that it apparently significantly reduces strategic uncertainty about other players’ 
behavior (Riechmann and Weimann, 2008). Since many economic interactions can be modeled   2
as coordination games, if this finding is general then it has a very important implication: 
improving communication in coordination games can increase efficiency and social welfare.  
This paper departs from the conventional coordination game literature by embedding the 
coordination game in a competition between groups, and studying the impact of nonbinding and 
costless communication. In this experimental environment, two groups compete in a lottery 
contest by expending costly efforts in order to win a prize. The framework is based on the 
widely-studied and classical Tullock (1980) model of rent-seeking. One key characteristic of this 
type of group contest is that coordinating on higher efforts can increase the probability of 
winning the prize but does not necessarily increase the competitors’ payoffs. Excessive efforts 
can be socially wasteful in contexts ranging from R&D competitions and political or advertising 
campaigns to war battles. In the experimental literature on the Tullock lottery contest, wasteful 
efforts that even exceed the equilibrium level are common, as first observed in Millner and Pratt 
(1989). This previous literature, however, has almost exclusively considered individual 
contestants. We study contests between groups when efforts are aggregated within each group 
with a weakest-link production technology, so the effective group effort equals the lowest effort 
expended by an individual in the group. We investigate whether group competition in these 
conditions mitigates the excessive efforts often observed in previous studies.   
The weakest-link feature of this contest competition resembles many real life 
competitions where the performance of the entire group depends on the worst performer within a 
group (Hirshleifer, 1983). For example, in many teamwork competitions each member of the 
team is responsible for a specific task. If any of the members performs their task poorly then the 
team loses the competition. Certain R&D competitions have such characteristics. In many sports, 
such as football and basketball, the weakest player on the team is likely to be a point of attack by   3
the opponents. Also, in terrorist attacks and in some military battles, the attacker's objective is 
often to successfully attack one target, rather than a subset of targets (Shubik and Weber, 1981; 
Clark and Konrad, 2007). 
The weakest-link contest combines features of a cooperative minimum effort game (Van 
Huyck et al., 1990) and a competitive contest (Tullock, 1980). Many experimental studies have 
shown that the introduction of competition between groups significantly increases individual 
efforts (Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; Van Dijk et al., 2001; Sutter and Strassmair, 2009; 
Croson et al., 2009). Recent experiments have also documented that competition between groups 
can improve coordination within each group (Bornstein et al., 2002; Myung, 2008; Sheremeta, 
2009).  
Although it has strong coordination incentives, the key difference in this competitive 
coordination game is that contributions are socially wasteful so efficiency increases when players 
coordinate on lower contribution levels. Without communication, we find that group members 
are able to achieve a modest level of coordination within each group. Allowing group members 
to communicate before expending any efforts leads to significantly greater coordination, but also 
results in more aggressive competition and substantially lower payoffs.
1 Group efforts actually 
exceed the highest equilibrium level in this communication treatment; by contrast, efforts are not 
significantly different from this equilibrium level in a non-group baseline treatment with 
individual competing agents. Our experiment thus provides evidence that communication can 
reduce efficiency in competitive coordination games. This result contrasts with experimental 
findings from public goods and other coordination games, where communication enhances 
                                                 
1 The fact that higher contributions lead to lower efficiency is the key feature of our experiment that differentiates 
our study from Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) and Sutter and Strassmair (2009). Although, Sutter and Strassmair 
(2009) also document that communication within groups increases individual contributions, such contributions lead 
to higher payoffs and higher efficiency. In contrast, in our experiment higher contributions lead to lower efficiency.   4
efficiency and often leads to socially optimal outcomes. We conclude that communication only 
helps improve coordination, not efficiency. Therefore, communication should be thought of as a 
coordination-enhancing rather than efficiency-enhancing mechanism. 
The finding that communication may reduce efficiency echoes the recent finding of 
Abbink et al. (2009), who show that by allowing intra-group punishment in inter-group contests 
leads to excessive and inefficient contest expenditures. In this study, we find that allowing intra-
group communication in weakest-link contests leads to excessive effort expenditures. The crucial 
difference of this study is the finding that communication, commonly perceived to enhance 
efficiency, may cause inefficiency in a coordination game. As we discuss in the conclusion, our 
results suggest that improved communication within rent-seeking interest groups may have 
negative efficiency consequences. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider a contest between two groups   and  . Each group consists of   risk-neutral 
players. All players simultaneously and independently expend irreversible and costly individual 
efforts     and    . Players within the winning group each receive the valuation of a prize  . 
Players within the losing group receive no prize. The total effective effort of each group depends 
on the lowest effort chosen by a member within the group – the so-called weakest-link. Group 
efforts determine winning probabilities using the widely-used Tullock (1980) lottery contest 
success function. Therefore, the probability of group   winning the prize is defined as: 
      ,       
       ,…,    
       ,…,              ,…,         ( 1 )  
That is, each group’s probability of winning depends on the lowest effort within that group 
relative to the sum of the lowest efforts by both groups (groups win with equal probability if they   5
both have a lowest effort equal to 0). The expected payoff for player   in group   can be written 
as: 
       ,               ,            .        ( 2 )  
Maximizing (2) with respect to     and solving the (symmetric) best response functions 
simultaneously gives the theoretical predictions for this contest. Since this game is a coordination 
game, there exist multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria in which the players within the same 
group match their efforts at the same level while best responding to the effort of the other group 
(Lee, 2008; Sheremeta, 2009). In particular, in any equilibrium, all players in each group best 
respond to the effort of the other group according to the following best-response functions: 
     √         and      √        . Moreover, because of the weakest-link technology for 
aggregating individual efforts, in equilibrium all players in each group must match their effort 
levels, i.e.          for all   and          for all  . The full set of pure strategy Nash equilibria is 
illustrated by the shaded area in Figure 1. 











Group B best 
response function 
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response function   6
Two specific equilibria of interest are the group Pareto dominant equilibrium and the 
Pareto efficient equilibrium. The group Pareto dominant equilibrium may be focal because the 
players within a group have incentives to coordinate with each other to increase their effort 
levels at any other equilibrium within the shaded area. In the group Pareto dominant equilibrium 
all players expend efforts of  /4 and no group has any incentive to deviate. On the other hand, 
the Pareto efficient equilibrium is when all players expend 0. In this equilibrium there is no dead 
weight loss from competition and each group is equally likely to win the contest. Note that any 
symmetric or asymmetric equilibrium within the shaded area in Figure 1 is more efficient than 
the group Pareto dominant equilibrium and less efficient than the Pareto efficient equilibrium. 
Following Riechmann and Weimann (2008), we define coordination as complete if a Nash 
equilibrium is played (i.e., all players within each group choose the same effort) and 
coordination as efficient if the Pareto efficient equilibrium is reached. 
If communication within each group is possible then results in the existing literature 
suggest that all players within each group should act cooperatively as one player (Sutter and 
Strassmair, 2009; Zhang, 2009). In this case it is appropriate to model all players within a group  
as trying to maximize their joint payoff instead of their individual payoff (2), and so the 
objective function of player   in group   can be written as: 
   
      ,               ,           ∑    
 
         ( 3 )  
Maximizing (3) with respect to       and solving the best response functions 
simultaneously gives us a unique Nash equilibrium where all players in each group match their 
efforts at the same level of  /4. Note that this is exactly the same as the group Pareto dominant 
equilibrium in the case with no communication, and is also the standard equilibrium in the two-
player Tullock contest. The group Pareto dominant equilibrium is also a coalition-proof Nash   7
equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987). Therefore, if communication indeed helps members within 
each group to improve coordination, they may select a more competitive (higher effort) 
equilibrium. Theory thus predicts that the introduction of within group communication can cause 
inefficiency. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
Our principal research question concerns the impact of communication in this 
competitive coordination game, so our experiment employs three treatments in a between-
subjects design. The main research treatment implements this group contest with communication 
permitted among members in each group (denoted treatment C). Two baseline treatments 
implement the contest with no communication (denoted treatment NC) and with groups replaced 
by individuals (denoted treatment I). In the group treatments C and NC, there are  =3 players in 
each group and all players within the winning group receive the prize of  =60. In the individual 
treatment I, the winner gets a prize of  =60. The stage game equilibrium prediction in treatment 
NC is that all players within each group should coordinate on the same effort level, but this effort 
level can vary between 0 and 15 and can vary across groups. The equilibrium prediction in 
treatments C and I is that all players should choose efforts equal to the group Pareto dominant 
equilibrium of 15. 
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics 
Laboratory. A total of 112 subjects participated in nine sessions – four sessions in each of the 
treatments C and NC (12 subjects per session) and one session with 16 subjects in treatment I. 
All subjects were Purdue University undergraduate students who participated in only one session   8
of this study. Some students had participated in other economics experiments that were unrelated 
to this research. 
The computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Each session proceeded in two parts. At the beginning of each part subjects were given the 
written instructions, shown in Appendix A, and the experimenter also read the instructions aloud. 
The first part of each session elicited subjects’ risk attitudes using multiple price list of 15 simple 
lotteries, similar to Holt and Laury (2002).
2 At the end of the session, one of the 15 lottery 
decisions was randomly selected for payment. The second part corresponded to 30 periods of 
treatment NC, C or I. In the group treatments subjects were placed into group A or B at the 
beginning of the first period, and they stayed within the same group for the duration of the 
experiment. They also competed against the same opposing group for all 30 periods. We chose 
this fixed matching protocol to allow subjects an opportunity to coordinate with each other on 
the Pareto efficient equilibrium. Therefore, the 48 subjects in each group treatment generate 8 
statistically independent, 30-period, 6-player supergames. Similarly, pairs of competing players 
were fixed for all 30 periods in treatment I, so the 16 subjects in that treatment generate 8 
independent, 2-player supergames.
3  
At the beginning of each period, each subject received 60 experimental francs as an 
endowment (equivalent to $2.00). Effort choices were framed in the instructions using the 
standard labels used in voluntary contribution mechanism public good provision experiments: 
                                                 
2 Subjects were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A yielded $1 payoff 
with certainty, while option B yielded a payoff of either $3 or $0. The probability of receiving $3 or $0 varied across 
all 15 lotteries. The first lottery offered a 5% chance of winning $3 and a 95% chance of winning $0, while the last 
lottery offered a 70% chance of winning $3 and a 30% chance of winning $0. 
3 Subjects were informed that the session would last for exactly 30 periods, so because the stage equilibrium in 
treatments C and I is unique this equilibrium prediction also holds (uniquely) for this finitely repeated game. As 
noted above, we conjectured that groups or individuals might coordinate on Pareto-improving outcomes in the 
repeated game, since this is frequently observed in the experimental literature even in finitely-repeated games with a 
unique equilibrium (e.g., Selten and Stoecker, 1986). Note that no repeated game equilibria exist with effort levels 
greater than 15.   9
they could allocate to a “group account” or an “individual account.” The instructions informed 
subjects that by allocating 1 franc to their individual account they would earn 1 franc, while by 
allocating 1 franc to their group account they could increase the chance of their group receiving 
the reward. Subjects could contribute any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. In 
treatment C, before subjects were asked to make the allocation decision, they had an opportunity 
to communicate with other members of the same group anonymously via a chat window for 60 
seconds. We asked subjects to follow two basic rules: (1) to be civil to one another and not to use 
profanity, and (2) not to identify themselves in any manner. Messages were recorded. After the 
chat period was over, all subjects simultaneously made their effort (allocation) decisions. 
After all subjects submitted their allocations to the group account, a random draw 
determined the winning group. A simple lottery was used to explain how the computer chose the 
winning group.
4 At the end of each period subjects were informed of group A’s and B’s effective 
efforts (i.e., the minimum effort in each group); or in the case of the individual treatment I, they 
learned both individuals’ effort choices. Subjects were paid for 5 randomly-drawn periods at the 
end of the experiment. Earnings were converted into US dollars at the rate of 30 francs to $1. On 
average, subjects earned $18 each and the experimental sessions lasted for about 60 minutes. 
 
4. Experimental Results 
Figure 2 displays the time series of the average and minimum effort in the three 
treatments. In the no communication (NC) treatment, average individual effort should be 
between 0 and 15. The actual average effort is about 10, indicating that subjects learn to 
coordinate their efforts on substantial level. The increased coordination is evident in the initial 
                                                 
4 Probabilities were explained in the instructions as a number of tokens placed in a bingo cage based on effort 
choices, and then one token draw determined the winning individual or group.   10
decline in average efforts, towards the average minimum effort. However, the persistent gap 
between average effort and average minimum effort indicates that the coordination is not 
complete. Recall that we define coordination as complete if all players within each group choose 
the same effort and coordination as efficient if the Pareto efficient equilibrium is reached. 
Importantly, note that the minimum effort does not decline to zero with repetition even in this 
treatment without communication. This finding stands in sharp contrast to previous findings in 
the minimum effort coordination game literature (Blume and Ortmann, 2007; Devetag and 
Ortmann, 2007), and could be due to our use of relatively small (three-person) groups or the 
competition between groups. To summarize: 
Result 1. Even without communication, substantial but incomplete coordination exists 
within groups, and efforts do not decline to 0 with repetition. 
Figure 2: Average and Minimum Effort 
 
In the individual (I) and communication (C) treatments, theory predicts an effort level of 














equilibrium prediction of 15 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.58, n=8).
5 Surprisingly, 
however, contributions are not lower in the C treatment, and the overall average effort is 20.13. 
Moreover, the average effective (minimum) effort within groups is higher than 15 in 28 out of 30 
periods, and this effective minimum effort is significantly greater than the equilibrium of 15 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.05, n=8).  
Result 2. With communication, groups coordinate effort allocations, but effective effort 
levels significantly exceed the equilibrium prediction of 15. The average effort in the individual 
treatment is not significantly different from 15. 
Although there is substantial coordination with and without communication, comparing 
the C and NC treatments indicates that with communication subjects coordinate better. In 
particular, the differences between the average individual effort and minimum individual effort is 
significantly lower with communication than without communication (Mann-Whitney test, p-
value < 0.05, n=m=8). 
Another way to measure the extent of coordination is to examine how much effort is 
wasted due to unequal effort choices within groups. We define mean wasted effort in a group by 
taking the average of the differences between individual effort and the group minimum effort 
within each group (Riechmann and Weimann, 2008). Complete coordination is reached when the 
group wasted effort equals zero. Figure 3 indicates that subjects in treatment NC learn to 
coordinate over time, as their wasted effort is substantially reduced in the second half of the 
experiment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p -value < 0.05, n=8). Nevertheless, the degree of 
coordination is better in the treatment C in almost all periods, and is significantly different from 
                                                 
5 All non-parametric tests employ only the independent observations of six subjects in treatment NC and treatment C 
and two subjects in treatment I, who never interact with other subjects.   12
treatment NC (Mann-Whitney test, p-value < 0.05; n=m=8). These findings lead to the following 
conclusion. 
Result 3. Communication improves coordination. 
Figure 3: Mean Wasted Effort 
 
Next we compare the average and minimum effort in the C and NC treatments. Blume 
and Ortmann (2007) and Sutter and Strassmair (2009) document that communication leads to 
significantly higher coordination and efforts. Consistent with these previous studies, the average 
and minimum effort in the C treatment is significantly higher than the average and minimum 
effort in the NC treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p-value < 0.05, n=m=8).  
Result 4. Communication increases average and minimum group efforts. 
This result is illustrated in Figure 4, which displays individual or group effective average 
effort in the three treatments. Each average effort represents one independent observation, either 
a group of six interacting subjects in the C and NC treatments, or an interacting pair of subjects 











Avg (NC) Avg (C)  13
Although considerable heterogeneity exists across groups, note that the distribution of average 
efforts in the C and NC treatments only slightly overlap. 
Figure 4: Distribution of Minimum Efforts 
   
In previous studies on coordination, higher efforts corresponded to greater efficiency, 
while in the present environment higher efforts lead to lower efficiency. Recall that the Pareto 
efficient equilibrium occurs when all players expend 0 efforts. At this equilibrium there is no 
deadweight loss from competition, and each group is equally likely to win the prize of 60. Figure 
5 displays average payoffs across all periods of the experiment. Because of the over-contribution 
of efforts in the C treatment the average payoff is lower than the payoff in the NC treatment in 
all 30 periods. This treatment difference is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p-value < 
0.05, n=m=8). 
Result 5. Communication decreases payoffs and efficiency.  
This result contrasts with experimental findings from public goods, team production, and 




















6   To summarize, communication improves coordination and increases 
individual efforts. However, this increase in individual efforts reduces payoffs and is inefficient. 
Not only are efforts under communication higher than the efficient equilibrium effort of 0, but 
they are also usually higher than the highest possible equilibrium effort of 15. Note that 15 is the 
maximum rationalizable effort level; i.e., given any effort level chosen by the opponents, 15 is 
the maximum effort that a rational player should expend (cf. Figure 1). As a result of this over-
contribution of efforts, the average payoff in the NC treatment is twice as high as the average 
payoff in the C treatment. 
Figure 5: Average Payoff per Player 
 
To better understand this over-contribution of efforts we conduct a multivariate 
regression analysis to identify a simple reduced-form relationship between some key feedback 
                                                 
6 An exception is Buckley et al. (2009), who show that within-group communication can be harmful in common 
pool resource games when individual appropriators share their output in groups of optimal size. Communication 
among sellers also causes inefficiency in oligopolistic competition if it leads to collusion (Friedman, 1967; Davis 
and Holt, 1998), but this inefficiency arises from reduced consumer surplus. Colluding sellers charge higher prices, 
increasing their own payoffs. In contrast, in our study communication reduces the payoffs of parties involved in the 
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variables and effort. To account for heterogeneity across subjects, we employ a random effect 
error structure with individual subject effects. The regressions are of the following form: 
 
effort            risk      effort         win         group-effort      
                          othergroup-effort           
1
t             
    (4) 
Where effortit is player  ’s effort in a period t, risk  is a risk preference variable counting the 
number of risky options B chosen by player   on the preliminary lottery choice task (for details 
see footnote 2), effortit-1 is player  ’s effort in the previous period, winit-1 is an indicator that 
denotes whether player    won in the previous period, group-effortit-1 and othergroup-effortit-1 
denote effective (minimum) own group effort and other group effort in the previous period, and 
   are individual subject effects. To allow for time effects, all regressions include 1/period. 
The key variable we wish to focus on in these regression estimates is othergroup-effortt-1. 
A positive and significant coefficient estimate on the othergroup-effortt-1 variable indicates that 
subjects tend to choose higher efforts when they observe a higher effort chosen by their 
opponents in the previous period. While estimation of a structural belief-learning model is 
beyond the scope of the present paper, consider the simple assumption that subjects form beliefs 
using Cournot expectations, which is a common approximation used in theoretical and empirical 
learning models (e.g., Ho, 2008). In other words, suppose they tend to believe that a higher effort 
by the opponent in the previous period is likely to be followed by a similar, high effort in the 
current period. Inspection of the recorded chat messages provides some evidence for such 
Cournot type of expectations for every session.
7 
                                                 
7 For examples: “I think we stick to 25, because they seem to stick to 21” (session 081110 group 2, period 7); 
“wow… they went for 30? let's go for 31 then” (session 090311 group 4, period 3); “hmm…i guess they are just 
going 20…ya…how about we try 25?” (session 090303, group 4, period 11); “they are still at 30…suggestions? … 
30…group consensus, yes?” (session 090331, group 1, period 11). The significant and positive effortt-1 coefficients 
in Table 1 document significant persistence in efforts and provide a systematic empirical rationale for such a belief.   16
We separate observations in which the efforts are above or below 15 since the reaction 
functions are sloped negatively and positively in these two cases (cf. Figure 1). (Recall that 15 is 
also the maximum rationalizable effort level.) In specification (1), the positive othergroup-effortt-
1 coefficient is consistent with the upwardly-sloped reaction functions for the efforts less than 15. 
Similarly, in specification (2), the negative (although not significant) othergroup-effortt-1 
coefficient is consistent with the downwardly-sloped reaction functions for the efforts higher 
than 15. This demonstrates that in the NC treatment groups strategically adjust their efforts in 
response to the efforts of their opponents. In the NC treatment only 6% of group efforts (81 out 
of 1392) are not rationalizable (bottom of Table 1). 
Table 1: Feedback Determinants of Effort (Random-Effect Models) 
Treatment and Data Subset 
Dependent variable, effortt  
No Communication Communication Communication Individual 
Low High Low High Low  High  Low High 
Specification (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
riskt  0.08 -0.23 0.01  0.14  0.02 0.17 0.11 0.45 
  [number of risky options B]  (0.06)  (0.48)  (0.19)  (0.16)  (0.19)  (0.15)  (0.25)  (0.24) 
effortt-1  0.43** 0.12 0.76**  0.46**  0.75**  0.41**  0.49**  0.60** 
  [effort in previous period]  (0.07)  (0.20)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
wint-1  -0.66* 0.07  -1.05 1.67* -0.84  1.57*  -1.39  -4.26** 
  [1 if won in previous period]  (0.31)  (1.45)  (0.58)  (0.77)  (0.58)  (0.75)  (1.17)  (1.17) 
group-effortt-1 0.34**  0.41  (^)  (^)  (^)  (^) 
  [effective group effort in t-1] (0.09)  (0.36)     
othergroup-effortt-1  0.22** -0.14 0.22** 0.13* 0.22**  0.20**  -0.02  0.15 
  [effective effort of other in t-1] (0.05)  (0.45)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.15)  (0.10) 
win message volume  1.39** 6.01** 
  [number of “win” chat messages]  (0.51)  (0.73) 
1/period  3.44 1.45 2.02 -0.49 2.25  -0.54  10.49*  -3.74 
  [inverse of period number]  (2.10)  (8.39)  (1.66)  (3.86)  (1.69)  (3.66)  (5.22)  (5.38) 
Constant 0.93  12.79  2.84  7.41**  2.10  3.88*  6.05**  4.92 
(0.55) (7.37) (1.51) (1.58) (1.49)  (1.55)  (2.17) (3.39) 
Observations 1311  81  540  852  540  852  227  237 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
(^) group-effortt-1 is highly correlated with effortt-1 in the communication treatment (correlation =0.96 in specifications 3 & 5 
and 0.88 in specifications 4 & 6), thus they are not included in specifications 3 through 6. 
All models include a random effects error structure, with individual subject effects. Columns labeled "High" ("Low") include 
only those observations in which othergroup-effortt-1 is greater than (less than or equal to) 15. Win messages include any of 
the following words: “win” “winning” “won” in the chat communication.    17
By contrast, 61% (852 out of 1392) of group efforts in the C treatment exceed the 
maximum rationalizable effort of 15. Moreover, in the C treatment the othergroup-effortt-1 
coefficient is always positive and significant (specifications 3 and 4) regardless of whether 
othergroup-effortt-1 is greater or less than 15. In other words, at least for this maintained 
assumption of Cournot-like belief updating, it appears that communicating groups fail to 
recognize the incentive to reduce efforts in response to above-equilibrium efforts chosen by their 
competitors.
8 This is somewhat surprising given the rich and nearly free-form communication 
within groups permitted by the chat windows, as well as the previous literature that suggests 
groups often make more rational decisions than individuals do (Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Sutter, 
2005). It is also surprising given that each member of the group has “veto” power to lower 
effective group effort in this minimum-effort game, and more rational individuals can employ 
this power when the group effort is unreasonably high.
9 
Individuals do not take advantage of the opportunity to unilaterally lower their group’s 
effective effort, however. The chat data suggest that subjects’ competitive tendencies are 
strengthened by their communications. Define a “win message” as a chat statement that mentions 
the words “win” or “winning” or “won” in a given period.
10 Someone in the chat room used at 
least one of these words in exactly one-half of the 480 chat periods, and all 16 groups in this 
                                                 
8 Replacing the lagged opponent effort (Cournot beliefs), othergroup-effortt-1, with the average past opponent effort 
(Fictitious Play beliefs) reduces the explanatory power of the estimates; and while the coefficient estimate on past 
opponent efforts was still positive for the column (4) specification it is no longer statistically significant. 
9 Appendix B contains some selected chats for a randomly-selected group in one of the sessions. The discussions 
illustrate (1) how subjects use the communications to coordinate effort choices; (2) reactions to effort choices of 0 
by individual group members; (3) how groups react to previous round effort levels of their opponent group; and (4) 
competitive escalation of higher effort levels in an attempt to win the contest, even when these effort levels far 
exceed the equilibrium. 
10 Some examples are shown in Appendix B. There, every single mention of word “win” corresponds to a discussion 
about the effort level of at least 15, such as: “okay 30.. we will win” (period 18) or “this is bad.. it has to be 40.. or 
we won’t win..” (period 19).   18
treatment indicated win messages in at least 4 periods.
11 The average effort is 17.4 in the 240 
periods without a win message, compared to 22.8 in the other 240 periods when at least one “win 
message” is sent by a group member in the chat room preceding the effort choice. In model 
specifications 5 and 6 of Table 1 we add a variable indicating the number of such win messages 
expressed in the period prior to the effort choice. The results indicate that such messages are 
strongly associated with higher effort choices, especially in the regression (specification 6) in 
which efforts are already too high. It appears that many groups focus on winning the contest, 
even when their efforts already exceed the maximum rationalizable level. 
In summary, the analysis above provides two complementary explanations of why 
communication leads to higher efforts and thus lower efficiency. First, communication acts as a 
coordination device, allowing groups to make decisions with less wasted effort. As a result, 
communication induces group behavior closer to the inefficient group Pareto dominant 
equilibrium. Second, communication encourages group discussions about the importance of 
winning, and thus it makes them less sensitive to their wasteful and excessive effort expenditures 
in the contest. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Communication in coordination games has been shown in previous studies to induce 
greater coordination, improve efficiency and increase individual payoffs. This study shows that 
the introduction of communication causes too much competition and thus reduces efficiency and 
individual payoffs in an experiment in which groups compete in a weakest-link contest by 
expending costly efforts. Not only do subjects compete too much, but such competition is not 
                                                 
11 Across all 16 groups, the average number of periods (out of 30) with at least one “win message” is 15 periods with 
a standard deviation of 6.41 periods.   19
predicted by theory. Although subjects in an individual-competition baseline treatment also 
compete aggressively, their effort levels are not significantly different from the Nash equilibrium. 
Communicating groups actually perform worse than individuals, since the effective effort levels 
of the groups statistically exceed the maximum rationalizable effort level.  
Although our main finding is novel, it is not inconsistent with the broad literature 
discussed in the introduction highlighting the positive effects of communication in public goods 
and related games. We also find that communication improves coordination and reduces free-
riding within groups. The key point that our experiment adds is that this improved coordination 
occurs even when it reduces, rather than enhances, efficiency. Therefore, communication should 
be thought of as a coordination-enhancing rather than efficiency-enhancing mechanism. 
The experimental environment implemented the classical Tullock model of rent-seeking, 
which has been widely used to model incentives for competing interest groups to influence 
public policy. While more confident conclusions await further research, we can note preliminary 
implications of our results for this setting. In particular, our findings indicate that communication 
results in greater wasteful rent-seeking. Based on results from Sutter and Strassmair (2009) and 
Sheremeta (2009), we suspect that other mechanisms to aggregate individual efforts into group 
contests would also result in increased efforts when groups can communicate. This suggests that 
enhanced communication opportunities afforded by new information technologies, such as 
“grassroots” internet-based political organizing that is increasingly being utilized by interest 
groups (Fisher, 1998; Sylvia, 2002), might reduce social efficiency even while it improves group 
cohesion and coordination. In this rent-seeking environment, anything that leads to better 
coordination can reduce efficiency.   20
Obviously, our results were obtained in the specific environment that was used in the 
experiment. Future research can investigate how robust our findings are when the best-shot or 
summation (perfect-substitutes) technology is used within groups instead of the weakest-link 
effort aggregation rule (Abbink et al., 2009; Sheremeta, 2009). Two pilot sessions we have 
conducted suggest that the general conclusion of our experiment stands: communication also 
improves coordination but reduces efficiency in the best-shot and perfect-substitutes contests. 
We chose to focus on the weakest-link rule, since it affords subjects the ability to unilaterally 
reduce their group’s choice, increasing the chances that some group members would reduce the 
excessive effort expenditures. Future research could also consider other realistic extensions to 
the group-contest environment. For example, between-group communication might permit 
groups to collude and reduce wasteful efforts, and allowing subjects to choose whether to 
communicate with their own group or with others might also increase efficiency. Results 
reported in Sutter and Strassmair (2009) for a different team contest environment suggest that 
between-group communication – a form of “diplomacy” in this context – could help subjects 
coordinate on a Pareto superior outcome. Although this is an interesting conjecture for future 
research, the findings of our experiment still make a clear point: communication is a good 
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Appendix A – Experiment Instructions 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple.  If you follow them closely and make appropriate 
decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. 
The experiment will proceed in two parts. Each part contains decision problems that require you to make a 
series of economic choices which determine your total earnings. The currency used in Part 1 of the experiment is 
U.S. Dollars. The currency used in Part 2 of the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a 
rate of _30_ francs to _1_ dollar. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. 12 
participants are in today’s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your 
cooperation.  
At this time we proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
YOUR DECISION 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How 
much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision problems are not 
designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what 
you really would choose. 
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that 
there are a total of 15 lines in the table but just one line will be randomly selected for payment. You ignore which 
line will be paid when you make your choices. Hence you should pay attention to the choice you make in every line. 
After you have completed all your choices a token will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens 
numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which line is going to be paid. 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in that line, 
you will receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings 
in the case you chose option B there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo 
cage now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then compared with the numbers in 
the line selected (see the table). If the token number shows up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number 
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1  $1  $3   never  $0   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, 
       14,15, 16,17,18,19,20 
 
2  $1  $3   if 1 comes out of the bingo cage  $0   if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
3  $1  $3   if 1 or 2 comes out  $0   if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
4  $1  $3   if 1,2, or 3  $0   if  4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
5  $1  $3   if 1,2,3,4  $0   if  5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
6  $1  $3   if 1,2,3,4,5  $0   if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
7  $1  $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6  $0   if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20   
8  $1  $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7  $0   if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20   
9  $1  $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  $0   if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20   
10  $1  $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9  $0   if 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20   
11  $1  $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10  $0   if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20   
12  $1  $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11  $0   if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20   
13  $1  $3   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12  $0   if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20   
14  $1  $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13  $0   if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20   
15  $1  $3   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10  
       11,12,13,14  $0   if 15,16,17,18,19,20   
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
YOUR DECISION 
The second part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. At the beginning of the first 
period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 3 people: group A or group B. You will 
remain in the same group for all 30 periods of the experiment. At the beginning of the first period, your group will 
be paired with another group. This pairing remains the same for all 30 periods of the experiment. Either group A or 
group B will receive a reward. The reward is 60 francs to each group member.  
Each period you will be given an endowment of 60 francs and asked to decide how much to allocate to the 
group account or the individual account. You may allocate any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. An 




After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. These earnings 
will be converted to cash and paid at the end of the experiment if the current period is one of the five periods that is 
randomly chosen for payment. 
1)  Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from your individual account and the earnings from 
your group account. 
2)  For each franc in your individual account, you will earn 1 franc in return. So, if you keep all 60 francs that 
you are endowed with to your individual account you will earn 60 francs. But you can also earn some 
francs from your group account. 
3)  By contributing to the group account you may increase the chance of receiving the reward for your group. 
In determining which group receives the reward, the computer will consider only the lowest contribution 
in group A’s account and the lowest contribution in group B’s account. If the lowest contribution in 
group A’s account exceeds the lowest contribution in group B’s account, group A has higher chance of 
receiving the reward and vice versa. If your group receives the reward then in addition to the earnings from 
your individual account you receive the reward of 60 francs from your group account. A group can never 
guarantee itself the reward. However, by increasing your contribution, you can increase your group’s 
chance of receiving the reward. 
Your Group   27
4)  The computer will assign the reward either to your group or to the other group, via a random draw. So, in 
each period, only one of the two groups can obtain the reward. 
 
Example 1. Random Draw and Earnings 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a random draw. Let’s say the 
members of groups A and B allocate their francs in the following way. 




















































In group A, member 1 contributes 20 francs, member 2 contributes 15 francs, and member 3 contributes 10 
francs to group A’s account. In group B, member 1 contributes 1 franc, member 2 contributes 10 francs, and 
member 3 contributes 5 francs to group B’ account. 
Then the computer chooses the lowest contribution in group A’s account and the lowest contribution in 
group B’s account. The two highest contributions in group A and the two highest contributions in group B will not 
be considered by the computer. In this example, member 3 has the lowest contribution of 10 francs in group A and 
member 1 has the lowest contribution of 1 franc in group B. For each franc of member 3 in group A the computer 
puts 1 red token into a bingo cage and for each franc of member 1 in group B the computer puts 1 blue token. 
Thus, the computer places 10 red tokens and 1 blue token into the bingo cage (11 tokens total). Then the computer 
randomly draws one token out of the bingo cage. If the drawn token is red group A receives the reward, if the token 
is blue group B receives the reward. You can see that since group A has more tokens it has a higher chance of 
receiving the reward (10 out of 11 times group A will receive the reward). Group B has a lower chance of receiving 
the reward (1 out of 11 times group B will receive the reward). 
Let’s say the computer made a random draw and group A receives the reward. Thus, all the members of 
group A receive the reward of 60 francs from the group account plus they also receive earnings from the individual 
account. All members of group B receive earnings only from the individual account, since group B does not 
receive the reward. The calculation of the total earnings is shown in Table 2 below. 

































60+40 = 100 
60+45   = 105 















At the end of each period, the total number of francs in the two groups’ accounts, group which receives the 
reward, earnings from individual and group accounts, and total earnings for the period are reported on the outcome 
screen as shown below. Please record your results for the period on your record sheet under the appropriate 





You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. At the beginning of 
the first period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 3 people: group A or group B. You 
will remain in the same group for all 30 periods of the experiment. At the beginning of the first period, your group 
will be paired with another group. This pairing remains the same for all 30 periods of the experiment. Either group 
A or group B will receive a reward. The reward is 60 francs to each group member. A group can never guarantee 
itself the reward. However, by increasing your contribution, you can increase your group’s chance of receiving the 
reward. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for actual payment in Part 2 
using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
Are there any questions? 
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Appendix B – Example Chats for Group 1 in Selected Periods of 
Session 081110 
 
P E R I O D   1          
  hey  guys         
  yo          
 whats the lowest ur gna put?           
 I think we should bet real low on the first time like10 
francs    
1 0           
 the other group will probably bet high and well lose 
money    
  so  10  good?       
  lets  go  for  15        
 i was thinking more like 5 cos we just get a dollar 
more per period if we win   
  okay  14         
          
P E R I O D   2          
  that  sucked        
 how about 20 this time and yes it did suck         
 i still think we should bet low           
  2 0 ?           
  yes  no?         
 we still win more per individual cos the guy who bet 
20 would just earn 80   
  agreed?         
 and we earn 60 thats just 20/30 = 30 cents more       
          
P E R I O D   5          
  ok  who  put  0?        
 not me i put 10             
 u just lost me 20 francs           
 we should put 15 at least now           
  i  didnt!         
 i know ... someone is putting 0           
  okay  15         
  yes?  eveyone  agree        
 ok evry1 put 21 then.. thats 1 more than theirs and a 
sure victory     
  yeah          
          
P E R I O D   6          
 theres no use ... someone keeps putting 0         
 someone in here is bidding lower than their saying 
and is dumb...     
 ok whoever put 15.. u won 45.. had u put 21 u would 
have won 39 + 60= 99..   
 i'm putting 0 for the rest of them now, because of the 
idiot in our group     
  evryq  put  21  please        
 once more then i'm done           
  21  ...  everyone!        
 theyre winning at 20 each time its jst 1 franc more       
          
PERIOD  7      
 that was good       
 keep putting 21 dont worry     
 just bad drawing       
 keep putting 21       
 okay fine 21 all the time?     
  yeah        
 its random clock generation the next is ours   
 21 again         
 this is stupid if we dont get drawn     
 one last time       
 we will ... its luck of the draw     
        
PERIOD  8      
 there u go         
 finally my goodness!       
 okay 21 every time       
 21 is our lucky number ... keep goin' with it ...   
 ok its human psych.. they wil put 22 now../ evry1 put 
25 
 or 21 if u wna try one more time.. ur call   
 evry1s bets quick       
 im staying with 21... if it gets too high it's not worth 
it 
 i think 21 is good       
  ok        
        
PERIOD  9      
 i wont say i told u so       
 who did that       
 WHO"S PUTTING 0!!!!!!!!!!!!!!     
 i KNOW!!!!!!!       
 member 3 did you put 0????     
 no i stuck with 21.. but i told u theyd go higher  
 so lets just put 27 now       
21        
        
PERIOD  10      
 group b is going to be rich this is dumb   
 just keep putting 21 ... we have about half the bingo 
balls .... its a 50 % chance 
 IF WE ALWAYS PUT IN 21 !!!!     
  exactly        
 i am!           
 and someone dosent keep putting in 0   
 what the heck       
  21  gain      
 21 for the rest of the game     
  ok        
  fine        
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P E R I O D   1 2          
  i'm  pissed         
 theyre on to 21... thts y we had 25 we need a diff 
number.;. go with 27     
  or  0  ur  call         
  2 7   o n e   t i m e        
  ok          
  k ?           
  yeah          
  c o o l           
          
P E R I O D   1 5          
 how bout 0 for one more and then we go in at 30... 
agree?     
 keep going for 0.. theyre just earning a dollar more 
per peridd.. wiat for them to go low 
  y e a h   c o o l          
  sounds  good        
  gr8          
 60 francs is a dollar so if we bid 0 were garenteed 
that price... not bad     
          
P E R I O D   1 6          
 one more time ... then hit them with 30         
 30 now? or 0 for one more??           
 okay thier at 20 so lets go for 30!           
  excellent!!!        
 quik. i need ur bids             
 30 now or the next one?           
  next          
 they might even put in 15           
  I   t h i n k   N O W         
  s o   0   f o r   t h i s   o n e ?         
  i  bid  30         
  y e s ?           
  o k   3 0           
  ok          
  mem2  -  30?       
  30  yes          
          
P E R I O D   1 7          
  w o n d e r f u l !         
 what do u want to hit them with this time?         
 lets keep on doin' 30             
 i think back to 0 it'll throw them off          
 go for 40 now.. we'll still earn 80           
 theyre going to up their bid!           
 i think 30 will do it             
  exactly          
 no it has to be more             
  3 0 !           
  3 5   f i n a l          
  3 5   f i n e           
  ok          
  c o o l           
  im  hungry         
        
PERIOD  18      
 stick to 30         
 we should have code names     
 i'll be sputnik       
 30's fine         
 ive noticed that we only win when they have more 
than 5 francs difference.. 
 so 30 or 0?       
 what do you wnat to do     
  30!        
  0?        
 okay 30         
 we will win       
 ok 30 one more time       
  maybe        
30        
  lol        
        
PERIOD  19      
 they are also putting in 30     
 hwo the heck is the other group so lucky!   
 this is bad.. it has to be 40.. or we wont win..   
 this program is favoring     
  yes        
 how bout 40       
 we stil win 80       
  40?        
 sounds good       
  coool        
  40!        
  agreed?      
  yeah        
        
PERIOD  20      
 lets keep it at 40       
 40 again?         
 they're not gonna go much higher than that   
 this is dumb though... if we lose we only get 20 
francs 
 45 now.. we win 5 francs less.. but 15 more than 60 
 okay 45         
 45.. one time...       
 might as well take a risk ... we have no money 
anyway 
  true        
 thts the spirit...!       
45        
 go for it         
45        
        
PERIOD  21      
 you have to be kidding me!     
 they are just gonna match whatever we put   
 ur telling me..       
 lets just stay at 40         31
 this program is favoring... we were higher         
  again          
 no.. its no use.. lets go 0           
  agreed          
0           
 let them come dowbn.. then hit them         
  l i k e   b e f o r e          
  0 ?           
  y e s           
          
P E R I O D   2 2          
  0   a g a i n ?          
 we should go 0 one more time           
 gr8.. they just won 15 more.. 0 again         
 or 40? they'll know what were doing         
  okay  0          
 0 and then next time we do it .. we'll only do one 0       
 theyre lucky not smart haha.. we're smarter         
 we should meet after to see who each other are       
  doesnt  show       
          
P E R I O D   2 3          
  3 5 ? >           
  gr8..  now  go  45        
 what if both groups put 0?           
  no          
 lets go 40 .... in between           
  they  know..  we'll  go  high  now       
 then either of us would just get the money         
  yeah..  40         
  f i n a l           
  40  agreed         
  40  ...  yeah         
 
 